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We analyze the effect of European Union (EU) membership on financial dollarization for the 
Central and Eastern European countries. Using a unique monthly dataset that spans about two 
decades, we find that both the accession process toward EU membership and EU entry have a 
direct impact on deposit and loan dollarization. EU membership reduces deposit dollarization 
while it increases loan dollarization. The negative effect on deposit dollarization captures the 
increased confidence of the private sector in the domestic currency as they consider the EU 
admission process to reflect their government’s commitment in promoting policies of long-
run currency stability. The positive impact on credit dollarization is the outcome of a greater 
convergence of exchange rates to the euro and the subsequent anticipation for a lower 
currency risk, which diminishes the cost of foreign currency borrowing. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
  Does the prospect of European Union (EU) membership affect the level of financial dollarization 
(FD)? If so, toward which direction, and does the effect differ between deposit (DD) and loan dollarization 
(LD)?
1 These questions are important as two decades of research on the subject of FD have unveiled its 
significance as a potential source of financial crises and macroeconomic instability, especially in the event 
of sudden exchange rate fluctuations. Given our incomplete understanding of the ingredients that influence 
FD and in particular the potential role of EU membership, this paper examines the determinants of DD and 
LD in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by focusing on the impact of both the transition process toward 
EU accession and of the eventual membership itself. 
Even though the FD literature has a long history with regard to the investigation of its drivers, the 
potential influence of EU membership has only recently attracted the attention of researchers, the 
consideration of which has offered mixed results. On the one hand, Genberg (2004), Levy-Yeyati (2006), 
and Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) offer the view that EU membership by leading eventually to euro 
adoption triggers higher FD in anticipation of admission to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The 
mechanism of this positive channel is expressed by the higher trade and financial transactions with the EU, 
a greater convergence of exchange rates to the euro, a growing acceptance of the euro as a store of value, 
the higher degree of borrowing in foreign currency in the expectation of diminishing currency risk, and full 
access to foreign currency holdings as the prospective EU members will have to lift their restrictions on 
capital mobility. 
The negative impact of joining the EU on FD, on the other hand, is depicted by Levy-Yeyati 
(2006), Honig (2009) and the related institutional view (De Nicoló et al., 2003, 2005). According to this 
view, a credible government (of high institutional quality) by following policies that promote long-run 
currency stability can build up its reputation and encourage confidence in the domestic currency. Joining 
the EU lends credibility to the policymakers of the candidate or acceded country as they are perceived in 
the eyes of the private sector to commit to policies that contribute to long-run macroeconomic and, 
especially, currency stability (Ravenna, 2008).  EU admission, therefore, acts as a commitment device to 
enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting faith in the local currency. 
                                                 
1 Financial dollarization refers to deposits and loans in foreign currencies and not just in dollars. In particular, and in line with 
the literature, DD reflects the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits of residents at domestic banks, while LD refers 
to the ratio of foreign currency loans to total loans of domestic banks to residents. Given the conflicting views expressed on this matter, we test the significance of joining the EU on 
FD, while controlling for the most important drivers found in the literature. Our empirical evidence shows 
that EU membership does influence FD. In particular, we find that all three stages of the accession process 
play a significant role on FD. That is, not only EU membership per se matters, but also the transition 
process toward joining the EU as this is captured by the official dates of the beginning of the process of 
membership negotiations and of the decision by the EU to allow candidate countries to join the Union (the 
conclusion of accession negotiations). As it concerns DD, both the transition period and eventual EU 
membership induce a decline, which increases in absolute magnitude across the three stages of accession as 
countries reach EU admission. This result provides support to the institutional-credibility view which may 
reflect the credibility effect of EU accession as domestic depositors consider this process to reflect their 
government’s commitment in promoting policies of long-run currency stability, as these are necessary 
requirements toward final admission (Ecofin, 2000). We find this effect to be robust to the inclusion of an 
indicator of institutional quality suggesting that EU admission has a complementary effect on DD above 
and beyond the effect exerted by the credibility of monetary and government policies through higher 
government quality. 
Interestingly enough, our results also indicate that EU membership, along with the two pre-
admission stages, leads to a contrasting effect on LD as borrowing in foreign currency rises. As in the case 
of DD, the absolute size of this effect increases as a country progresses from one stage of the process to the 
next. This finding suggests that lenders and borrowers of foreign currency view EU admission as a channel 
for higher convergence with the EU member states in both trade and financial links. This may also reflect 
their increased confidence in the policies of their national governments as holdings of foreign currency 
become less risky, especially in the expectation of euro adoption. Overall, the opportunity of more 
profitable transactions with the co-member states and the lower risk of foreign currency holdings 
encourage LD. This result continues to hold even when we explicitly control for an indicator of 
institutional quality.  
In general, these findings illustrate that foreign currency deposits and foreign currency loans 
respond asymmetrically to the prospect of EU admission. They, therefore, offer support to the joint 
consideration of both sides of the bank’s balance sheets when it comes to the analysis of financial 
dollarization. It is worth mentioning that all our findings are insensitive to a battery of tests, such as the use 
of alternative estimation techniques, instrumentation strategies, regression specifications, and consideration 
of country and period outliers. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation strategy and 
the dataset. Section 3 reports the findings of the analysis, while Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
  We follow the existing literature in choosing the potential drivers of FD to which we add three 
dummy variables that relate to the EU membership process. These are dummies that signify the periods of 
the beginning of the negotiation process (stage 1), the completion of the negotiation process at which the 
EU has decided for negotiating countries to join the EU (stage 2), and the date after which full membership 
is granted (stage 3).
2 As we examine independently the determinants of DD and LD, the benchmark 
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DDit (LDit) denotes DD (LD) in country i at time t, nfa stands for banks’ net foreign assets, while Xj 
represents a set of conditioning variables that are commonly found to influence both DD and LD.
3 These 
are the rate of inflation according to the currency substitution view (Savastano, 1996), the minimum 
variance portfolio (mvp) dollarization share according to the portfolio view (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003), 
the rate of depreciation to control for valuation effects in the measures of dollarization (Arteta, 2005), the 
interest rate differential to test the departure from uncovered interest rate parity (Basso et al., 2007), and an 
indicator of international financial integration (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) as a measure of financial 
openness (Luca and Petrova, 2008; Honig, 2009;  Neanidis and Savva, 2009).
4  
  To briefly explain the expected influence of these variables on FD note that Barajas and Morales 
(2003), Luca and Petrova (2008), and Neanidis and Savva (2009) have shown banks to limit their exchange 
                                                 
2 These dates appear in the Appendix, Table A1 and can be found at the official EU website: http://europa.eu/abc/history. 
3 Note that equation (2) controls explicitly for the effects of supply side variables on LD that are driven by the behavior of banks 
as illustrated by DD and nfa. This is justified by the findings of Luca and Petrova (2008) and Neanidis and Savva (2009), who 
show that supply side variables have a robust impact on LD in transition economies. 
4 The institutional view advanced by De Nicolo et al. (2005), Rennhack and Nozaki (2006), and Honig (2009) which supports 
the notion that improved quality of government institutions reduces FD, is not directly controlled for in our benchmark 
regressions as including such an index decreases our sample size by a fourth. To consider this important driver, however, we do 
include it in our extended regressions that appear below. Our results confirm its significance. rate risk by lending in foreign currency as they receive more foreign currency deposits suggesting the 
positive effect of DD on LD in equation (2). They also show that banks prefer to match the level of overall 
assets and liabilities by currency, so that they channel foreign currency deposits to the purchase of foreign 
assets. In this way, an increase in nfa, for a given level of DD, decreases LD.
5 High rates of inflation and 
depreciation by diminishing the value of the domestic currency, are expected to boost FD. Similarly 
positive is the recorded effect of mvp dollarization as it captures the importance of the volatility of inflation 
against that of real depreciation. Given that interest rate differentials are defined as local currency minus 
foreign currency rates, their increase should decrease (increase) DD (LD). Finally, greater financial 
integration with the rest of the world may raise both foreign currency deposits and credits. As financial 
openness makes the domestic banking and financial sector more accessible to foreign investors, a greater 
inflow of foreign currency will be the outcome of higher rates of return on deposits and investment 
projects. Domestics lenders, on the other hand, may be more willing to extend dollar credit to exporters and 
importers that require more foreign currency for their businesses, and especially for exporters earning 
revenue in dollars who are less risky with regard to dollar default. 
The set Dl includes two dummy variables that control for the regulatory and the high-dollarization 
environments. These are a dummy that considers the presence of restrictions on holding deposits (loans) in 
foreign currency based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(Arteta, 2005) and a dummy that controls for occasions of high degrees of dollarization (Neanidis and 
Savva, 2009). The former dummy is clearly expected to have a negative effect on FD, while the latter has 
been found to promote FD as it captures the bias of both depositors and lenders in highly dollarized 
countries to hold more foreign currencies in their portfolios due to higher currency risk. Following 
Honohan (2007), we first consider as highly dollarized environments those with DD and LD ratios in 
excess of 50%, although we take proper care in verifying our findings by altering the threshold level to the 
mean and median (Levy-Yeyati, 2006), at the 40% level (Rennhack and Nozaki 2006), and at the top 
quartile (Honohan, 2007).  
The main contribution of this paper is illustrated by the set EUk which is defined to include the three 
EU membership related dummies described above. We include the three dummies separately as each of 
them may unveil a different or an additional marginal impact of potential EU admission on FD. Their 
                                                 
5 An alternative interpretation for the negative impact of banks’ net foreign assets on LD is as follows. Given that many 
transition countries report highly negative net foreign assets of their banking sector (see, for instance, the negative mean value of 
nfa in Table 1), this represents a reflection of their funding sources from abroad. This external funding source, in turn, limits the 
need of banks for foreign currency lending. I thank a referee for this interpretation. significance will highlight the importance foreign currency market participants attach to the prospect of 
entering the EU as it concerns their increased confidence in the domestic currency and the growing 
anticipation of diminishing foreign currency risk. Our focus, therefore, will primarily be directed to the 
sign and significance of the coefficients δk (k = 1, 2, 3). Finally, εit and uit correspond to the error terms.
6 
  A variety of econometric procedures are used to estimate equations (1) and (2). The first is a standard 
panel regression technique, the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator preferred by Basso et 
al. (2007). The other two estimation procedures are based on techniques that address potential endogeneity 
of the right-hand-side variables. Our preference for these techniques lies in their consideration for 
addressing simultaneity bias, which is an obvious issue in these regressions. In line with the literature, we 
control for the possible endogeneity of inflation, depreciation, mvp dollarization, and interest rate 
differences as potential monetary policy instruments. In addition, we instrument for our indicator of 
financial openness and, for the case of LD, for DD and banks’ net foreign assets. Following the most recent 
articles in the literature (Luca and Petrova, 2008; Honig, 2009; Neanidis and Savva, 2009), we use as 
instruments the once lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables.
7 We also extent the instrument 
set to the second lag, the third lag, and any combination of these lags for the sake of robustness. The 
instrumentation techniques we utilize are the fixed and random effects 2SLS estimations with robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
8 
  One set of variables we do not instrument for are the three EU-related dummies. This requires that 
EU membership is not a function of financial dollarization, or of any variable affecting dollarization that is 
omitted in equations (1) and (2). We are reasonably confident that this condition is met. EU membership is 
certainly affected by factors like macroeconomic stability (inflation and currency depreciation); but 
equations (1) and (2) include these as control variables. And surely one would not argue that a country 
decides to join the EU because it aims in reducing the size of its FD. This could be seen as a side-effect, but 
clearly not as the main motivation for EU membership. 
                                                 
6 The importance of most of these drivers of FD is well explained in the survey paper of Levy-Yeyati (2006). In addition, Table 
A2 of our Appendix provides a detailed description of the variables used in the analysis and their respective sources. 
7 The instrumented variables appear in bold type in the Tables. 
8 We also subject our dataset to additional regression techniques, the results of which do not appear in the tables as they have no 
bearing for our findings. These include the fixed-effects, random-effects, standard IV-GMM, and FGLS estimators with an error 
structure of AR(1). The results of these regressions are available upon request from the author.   Turning on to the data, we use a unique unbalanced panel of monthly observations for all of the 
(twenty-four) CEECs.
9 Out of the sample, twelve countries are affiliated to the EU either as member states 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and 
Romania) or as candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey).
10 Data on DD and LD have been jointly collected 
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF and from national central bank reports with the 
sample period varying from one country to the other (the earliest period is 1986:1 (Turkey) and the latest 
2010:1 (Albania, Kazakhstan, Moldova)).
11 This yields a maximum sample size of 4,119 and 3,745 
observations for DD and LD respectively, though we end up working with an unbalanced panel of 3,465 
and 3,032 observations for equations (1) and (2) respectively due to missing data. Table 1 presents 
summary statistics of the variables involved in regressions (1) and (2), plus a few additional variables that 
are used in the sensitivity analysis. What stands out is the extent of both deposit and loan dollarization at an 
average of 39.64% and 41.02% respectively. It is interesting to note, however, that these figures vary 
widely across countries, with a minimum average DD (LD) of 11.10% (11.82%) in the Czech Republic and 
a maximum of 69.54% (70.37%) in Georgia. Finally, there appears to be a positive correlation between DD 
and LD of 40.31%. 
Figures 1a and 1b show the extent of both types of dollarization in the domestic banking system of 
the non-EU- and EU-affiliated countries, respectively. Some important characteristics stand out. First, the 
degree of dollarization exhibits substantial variation across countries. There are countries like Armenia, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Rep., that have relatively high levels of both DD and LD, while 
countries like the Czech Rep. and Slovak Rep. have low levels. Second, for some countries, Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia FYR, and Serbia, there is a notable mismatch 
between the levels of foreign currency deposits and loans. Third, Figure 1b illustrates changes in the pattern 
of both DD and LD for most of the countries that underwent the EU admission process. The vertical lines 
in each plot identify the beginning of each of the three stages of EU admission giving rise to the pre-
negotiation period and the (up to three) post-negotiation periods. It appears that for seven of these twelve 
                                                 
9 Our country sample includes Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine.  
10 Macedonia FYR even though a candidate for EU accession since 2005, as it submitted its membership application in 2004, is 
not officially a candidate nation as EU accession negotiations have not yet began. 
11 The period coverage of each country appears in the Appendix, Table A3. It is clear that the period for all countries extends 
well into 2009. Exceptions are the Slovak Republic (2008) and Slovenia (2006) as both have adopted the euro as their legal 
tender in January of 2009 and January of 2007, respectively. Given that our analysis refers to the pre-euro adoption effects of EU 
membership on FD, the end of period coverage for these two countries is shorter. countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), both the 
transition toward the EU and joining the EU has been matched with a decrease in DD and a respective 




3.1. Deposit dollarization 
 
  The estimation results of the baseline DD equation (1) appear in Table 2. The seven columns depict 
our three preferred estimation techniques (FGLS, 2SLS-FE, 2SLS-RE) with different lag structure of the 
internal instruments for the instrumental variable approaches. All seven regressions confirm the main 
findings of the literature as these are illustrated by the variables included in the sets Xj and Dl. The highly 
positive and significant coefficient of the high-dollarization dummy shows that the persistence of DD is 
higher in highly dollarized countries as depositors in these countries are more sensitive to currency 
fluctuations and macroeconomic uncertainty (Renhack and Nozaki, 2006; Neanidis and Savva, 2009). The 
degree of legal restrictions on the holdings of foreign currency deposits is also important as it diminishes 
the size of DD (De Nicoló et al., 2003; Levy-Yeyati, 2006; Honig, 2009). Against the findings first 
illustrated by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), that the level of DD is increasing with an increase in the mvp 
share of dollarization, we find that there is no such effect in our sample. We do, however, find support for 
the currency substitution view as higher inflation causes higher DD. Controlling for inflation, the rate of 
depreciation is not found to be associated with DD. In line with Arteta (2005), however, the significance of 
depreciation is reinstated once we drop inflation from the regression, pointing to collinearity between the 
two variables.
12  
In testing the uncovered interest rate parity, we observe that differences in the rates of interest appear 
to influence DD only in the FGLS regression with the direction being counter-intuitive. Once we account 
for its potential endogeneity, with any of the instruments, we find that interest rate spreads have no effect 
on DD. This finding is consistent with Basso et al. (2007) and Neanidis and Savva (2009), who find interest 
rate differences to influence the change in DD instead. This is expected as depositors adjust quickly their 
currency portfolio holdings to changes in interest rate differentials, making them less responsive in the 
long-run. Finally, higher international financial integration appears to have a positive effect on DD as 
                                                 
12 This, however, has no bearing on the coefficient estimates of the EU-related dummies. liberalization of the capital account increases the access of foreign individuals, firms, and banks on 
domestic banking products, including foreign currency deposits. 
  Focusing on the effects of the EU-related dummies in the set EUk, we observe the strong and robustly 
negative impact (at the 1% level) on DD of all three periods that correspond to the EU accession process. 
The citizens of a country that embarks upon entry negotiations with the EU decrease their foreign currency 
deposits by 1.6-3 percentage points, depending on the estimation procedure. The negative effects increase 
in size in the second stage of the process and vary between 5.4-7.5 percentage points, while the effect 
becomes even larger in the third stage upon admission and vary between 6.9-9.6 percentage points.
13 The 
last two rows of Table 2 reports the p-values of the Wald tests that examine the statistical equivalence 
between the EU-related dummies in pairs. The tests show that at each stage of the accession process the 
size of DD is increasingly diminishing.
14  
These figures are non-negligible as the first stage of the accession process is comparable to the impact 
of the restrictions on foreign currency deposits set by the regulatory arrangements, while the subsequent 
two stages far exceed this effect. Moreover, the sum of the three EU-related dummies exceeds in statistical 
significance the effect of the high-dollarization dummy.
15 The interpretation of these findings is that in the 
eyes of the private sector EU admission acts as a commitment device for the negotiating country’s 
policymakers that enhances their credibility as to the adoption of policies that promote long-run 
macroeconomic stability. This, in turn, promotes confidence in the domestic currency and diminishes the 
holdings of foreign currency deposits. This effect is strengthened as the country passes from one stage of 
admission to the next and depositors acknowledge the commitment and achievement of their policymakers 
in following policies that ensure financial stability, in line with the guidelines of the EU. 
  To establish the robustness of our main findings, we expand the regression equation (1) with 
additional control variables. These include a measure of trade openness on top of financial openness 
(Arteta, 2005; Honig, 2009), a dummy variable that measures the extent of alternative hedging 
                                                 
13 Note that the magnitude of the effects becomes greater and more stable once we control for potential endogeneity of the 
regressors in columns (2)-(7). The calculated effect in percentage points follows from the fact that the dependent variable is 
measured on a [0,1] scale, so that the appropriate interpretation in percentage terms requires multiplying the associated 
coefficient estimates by 100.  
14 The potential influence of EU membership on FD has also been examined by Neanidis and Savva (2009). Their analysis, 
which refers to the short-run period (changes in monthly values), does not unveil any significant effects of joining the EU. Their 
finding, however, is intuitively appealing and does not come into conflict with the finding in the current study as the transition 
process toward EU entry, being a long time period, should not affect the agent’s confidence and expectations in the short-run but 
rather in the long-run. 
15 All these results are supported by Wald tests of linear and non-linear hypotheses used to examine the equality of these (sets of) 
parameters. They are available upon request. opportunities for depositors as captured by the presence of a functional forward market (Arteta, 2005; Luca 
and Petrova, 2008), a variable that considers the asymmetry of exchange rate movements by constructing 
an index of bias in exchange rate policy (Renhack and Nozaki, 2006), an index of central bank exchange 
rate intervention to control for different exchange rate regimes (Barajas and Morales, 2003; Basso et al., 
2007), the maximum historical values of inflation and depreciation rates to capture any hysteresis effects 
(Arteta, 2005), a dummy to control for the immediate aftermath of the Russian crisis (Neanidis and Savva, 
2009), and a measure of institutional quality (De Nicoló et al., 2003; Levy-Yeyati, 2006; Honig, 2009). 
  Table 3 reports the results of the 2SLS-FE estimations, where we add each successive variable as we 
move to the right of the table.
16 Let us state from the outset that our findings are insensitive to the change in 
the specification of the regression equation. If at all, the estimates increase in absolute magnitude as we add 
more controls. In particular, all columns in Table 3 show that all three dummies that proxy for the EU 
accession process signify a decline in DD that is always significant at the 1% level. Consistent with Table 
2, even though we do not report the findings of the Wald tests, the size of the impact rises across the stages 
of the process. As for the new control variables, in line with Arteta (2005) trade openness encourages DD 
as relatively large export and import sectors require foreign currency for their transactions.
17 Forward 
market liberalization has no effect on DD, although dropping trade openness as a regressor turns this 
variable to take up a negative and significant sign.
18 This is in line with the argument that forward market 
liberalization allows depositors to insure against currency risk and hedge their exposure in the form of 
forward contracts. The variable that captures the asymmetry of exchange rate policy, which takes a value of 
0 in months of currency appreciation and 1 in months of currency depreciation, suggests the absence of a 
bias towards currency depreciation identified by Renhack and Nozaki (2006). Its zero impact implies that 
depositors respond symmetrically to upward and downward changes in the exchange rate toward local-
currency depreciation. As in Basso et al. (2007), the degree of exchange rate intervention by the monetary 
authorities has no explanatory power in explaining movements in DD.  
The next three variables we include, maximum inflation and depreciation rates and a dummy for the 
Russian crisis, are not significantly related to DD describing the lack of a hysteresis phenomenon and the 
negligible impact of the Russian crisis on the size of foreign currency deposits. The last column of the table 
                                                 
16 Our findings are qualitatively similar with the rest of the estimation techniques presented in Table 2. 
17 Note that the inclusion of trade openness refines the impact of the three EU dummies, compared to column (2) of Table 2, as it 
increases their magnitude. This supports the notion of competing effects of EU membership on DD that are offsetting each other 
when trade openness is not controlled for separately. Controlling for openness isolates the institutional quality effects of EU 
entry and leads to larger negative coefficients. 
18 This is justified by the positive correlation of trade openness and forward market liberalization in our sample. adds the (inverse of the) corruption perception index produced by Transparency International as a means of 
testing the direct impact of institutional quality on dollarization. Even though its introduction decreases our 
number of observations by a fourth, it does not affect the coefficient estimates of the EU-related dummies. 
In addition, as it proxies for the absence of corruption, its negative effect is indicative of the importance 
attached to higher quality institutions in promoting faith in the domestic currency. Therefore, one can view 
a country’s admission process to the EU as an alternative and complementary way to the improvement of 
its institutions as both enhance the government’s credibility in following policies that promote long-run 
economic stability. Having discussed the results of Table 3, it is fundamental to note that all these 
additional findings find strong support in the literature.  
 
3.2. Loan dollarization 
 
We now turn to examine the effect of EU membership on the other side of the bank’s balance sheet, 
the dollarization of loans. Table 4 presents the estimates of regression equation (2) with the variety of 
estimation techniques we have used for equation (1) in Table 2. Columns (1)-(3) estimate a specification 
similar to equation (1) of DD. That is, they do not take into account the potential impact of DD and of the 
banks’ net foreign assets on LD. The results are comparable to the ones outlined in Table 2. As for the case 
of DD, a highly dollarized country experiences a higher degree of LD, restrictions in the holdings of 
foreign currency loans limits the extend of LD, the mvp argumentation is once again not relevant in 
explaining LD, while greater international financial integration boosts LD stressing the borrowers’ 
increased access to foreign funding. In contrast to the findings under DD, we now find that inflation (as 
opposed to depreciation) is not relevant in explaining LD while depreciation of the local currency leads to 
higher LD. In addition, a greater wedge between domestic and foreign lending interest rates causes a higher 
degree of foreign currency borrowing as, ceteris paribus, the cost of borrowing in foreign currency 
becomes lower. Once again, these results are in line with the findings of the related studies in the literature. 
As regards the effects of the EU period dummy variables on LD, we find once again that all three of 
them are significant. Unlike the case of DD, however, now the effect runs in the opposite direction as they 
all encourage LD. In addition, the size of their effect is not statistically different across the three stages, as 
the p-values of the Wald tests reveal. Even so, the quantitative size of the effect of each individual stage is 
still substantial as it coincides with the effect of the regulatory restrictions placed upon foreign currency 
loans. The explanation of the positive impact of the EU membership process on LD hinges on three factors. First, given that we do not control for trade openness in regressions (1)-(6), EU membership also proxies 
for greater trade liberalization. As such, greater export and import activities provide hedging opportunities 
for firms as it makes it easier for them to hedge their foreign currency exposure. Second, due to a growing 
euro-orientation of exchange rate regimes which derive their credibility from the clause that EU 
membership will lead to an eventual adoption of the euro. Third, the prospect of monetary integration with 
the euro area spurs the private sector’s confidence in exchange rate stability. As this implies that the risk of 
an abrupt exchange rate movement is very low, it induces borrowers to increase their foreign currency 
borrowing. This decline in currency risk is the reason that banks are also more willing to extend loans in 
foreign currency. 
Moving to columns (4)-(6), the innovation corresponds to the inclusion of the level of DD and of the 
commercial banks’ net foreign assets as controls. Even though controlling for these two additional 
variables bears no qualitative influence on the impact of the remaining regressors, there are some 
noteworthy quantitative implications. Most importantly, the coefficient estimates of all EU dummies 
increase in magnitude so that now the Wald tests support the notion of convex effects on LD. As it 
concerns the effect of the variables themselves, they both confirm the findings of Luca and Petrova (2008) 
and Neanidis and Savva (2009) with regard to the importance of bank related variables as drivers of LD in 
CEECs. The strong positive effect of DD on LD highlights the banks’ desire to maintain matched positions 
of foreign currency deposits and loans, while the strong negative effect of their net foreign assets indicates 
their strategy to diversify their assets away from the provision of foreign currency loans. 
The final column of Table 4 extends the LD regression with the additional control variables described 
in Table 3. Foreign currency borrowing is now also affected by trade openness, the functioning of a 
forward market, the asymmetry of exchange rate policy, historical rates of depreciation, the Russian crisis, 
and the quality of institutions, all with the expected signs.
19 Thus, as for the case of DD, institutions exert 
an independent and complementary effect on LD on top of the effect of the EU membership dummies. 
  
3.3. Further robustness tests 
 
                                                 
19 Note that the positive effect of trade openness on LD in column (7) diminishes the respective magnitude of the impact by the 
EU dummies as compared to column (5). The decline in the effect is larger when we only add trade openness to column (5). This 
gives support to the thesis offered above as to the first factor that explains the positive impact of EU membership on LD. In other 
words, once we control for trade openness the EU dummies cease to proxy for this factor anymore. We have further subjected our findings to a series of robustness tests.
20 These tests, that our main 
results survive, include the modification of the definition of the high-dollarization dummy to take values 
for ratios above the mean and median, the 40% level, and the top quartile. We also limit the sample period 
to the post-1996 years to control for the early abnormal transition years experienced by the participants in 
the foreign currency market in CEECs as they were more favorable to foreign currency holdings due to the 
uncertainty that surrounded the success of market-oriented policies. Next, we test whether our findings are 
a consequence of outlier observations. To this end, we rerun our regressions by dropping a country at each 
time. We then control separately for the countries in our sample that have experienced high currency 
mismatches (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia FYR, and Serbia). Finally, we 
restrict our sample to the EU-affiliated countries. That is, the countries that appear in Figure 1b which are 
either EU members or candidates for admission. The confirmation of our findings along the line of these 




  Our aim in this paper has been to study the effect of EU membership on the deposit and loan 
dollarization of the financial system. The innovation of the paper has been two-fold. First, we used three 
distinct stages of the transition process toward full EU admission, as defined by the EU, and examined the 
marginal effect of each stage on both deposit and loan dollarization. Second, we conducted our analysis 
with the use of a unique panel dataset for 23 CEECs from the early 1990s to the late 2009. 
Our findings suggest that both the prospect of joining the EU – described by the two stages of the 
commencement of negotiations with the Union and their respective conclusion – and EU membership per 
se strongly impact upon FD. Deposit dollarization declines during all three stages of the EU admission 
process, with the effect becoming greater in absolute magnitude as a country surpasses each additional 
stage. This effect captures the importance the private sector attaches to the negotiation process and 
ultimately to EU entry as this reflects the commitment of the candidate country’s policymakers in 
following policies that promote macroeconomic and political stability. This process also offers signals of 
improvement in economic management and institutional development as the country’s policies receive 
external validation by the EU. It is these developments, therefore, that promote confidence in the domestic 
currency.  
                                                 
20 Although these results are not reported, they are available upon request from the author. Loan dollarization, on the other hand, is found to be continuously increasing during the course of EU 
negotiations and entry. This result is the outcome of a greater convergence of exchange rates to the euro 
and the subsequent anticipation for a lower currency risk, the latter diminishing the cost of foreign currency 
borrowing. These effects are robust to the consideration of indirect channels through which EU 
membership can boost credit dollarization, such as increased trade openness and liberalization of the capital 
account. 
Overall, our results corroborate the institutional-credibility view of the literature that emphasizes the 
improvement of government institutions as a way of limiting the degree of deposit dollarization by 
advancing EU membership as an additional channel through which this can be achieved. At the same time, 
however, they highlight the diverse impact of some factors on deposit and loan dollarization, notably the 
EU process of negotiation and entry. These findings advocate the joint consideration of both sides of the 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std  Deviation  Min  Max  Obs 
Deposit dollarization  39.64  18.00  4.39  93.00  4119 
Loan dollarization  41.02  23.05  1.75   93.48  3745 
High deposit dollarization dummy  29.82  45.75  0  100  4184 
High loan dollarization dummy  42.99  49.51  0  100  4184 
Net foreign assets  -2.46  27.45  -165.5  78.99  3970 
Restrictions 0.642  0.479  0  1  4039 
MVP dollar share  30.02  21.18  -12.13  109  4092 
Inflation 1.35  4.30  -5.65  123  4141 
Depreciation 0.677  4.94  -25.27  103.2  4118 
Interest rate difference (deposits)  0.101  0.271  -0.296  6.77  4024 
Interest rate difference (loans)  0.154  0.429  -0.349  8.17  3791 
Index of international financial integration  1.14  0.506  0.331  3.87  3609 
Dummy for start of EU accession process   0.168  0.374  0  1  4184 
Dummy for decision to join EU  0.042  0.201  0  1  4184 
Dummy for European Union membership  0.134  0.341  0  1  4184 
Trade openness  95.28  34.19  29.41  174.4  4017 
Dummy for forward market liberalization  0.415  0.492  0  1  3907 
Index of asymmetry of exchange rate movements 0.535  0.491  0  1  4118 
Index of exchange rate intervention  0.644  0.401  0  1  3977 
Dummy for maximum inflation rate  0.006  0.075  0  1  4141 
Dummy for maximum depreciation rate  0.006  0.076  0  1  4121 
Dummy variable for Russian crisis  0.009  0.094  0  1  4182 
Corruption perception index   3.65  1.14  1.5  6.7  3131 




Table 2: Deposit Dollarization: Benchmark Model 


























































































































































Countries / Obs  24 / 3465  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 3421  24 / 3421  24 / 3399  24 / 3399 
R-square (adjusted)   0.675  0.686  0.694  0.705  0.739  0.747 
Lag structure of internal instruments    One lag  One lag  Two lags  Two lags  Three lags  Three lags 
Wald test of start EU = decision EU  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Wald test of decision EU = join EU  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.006 
Notes: Dependent variable is deposit dollarization. p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors for the 2SLS-FE and 2SLS-RE estimators and 
adjusted for panel heteroskedasticity for the FGLS estimator that controls for country fixed effects. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in 
bold type. Instruments are the once lagged values of the endogenous variables in columns (2) and (3), the twice lagged values in columns (4) and (5), and the 
third lagged values in columns (6) and (7). Even though not reported, results are the same when using as instruments any combinations of the first to third 
lagged values. Findings are also qualitatively similar for the variables of interest with Fixed-Effects, Random-Effects, GMM, and FGLS estimators with an 
error structure of AR(1). The Wald tests present the p-values of the simple linear hypotheses about the equality of the EU-related parameters in pairs. 
 
 
 Table 3: Deposit Dollarization: Extended Model 






















































































































































































































































Corruption             -0.019 
(0.000) 
Countries / Obs  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 3443  24 / 2545 
R-square (adjusted)  0.540 0.542  0.538  0.535  0.536  0.536  0.536  0.583 
Notes: Dependent variable is deposit dollarization. All columns report results based on the 2SLS-FE estimator (findings are qualitatively similar with FE, RE, FGLS, GMM, and 2SLS-RE 
estimators, and FGLS estimator with AR(1) errors). p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables 
are in bold type. Instruments are the once lagged values of the endogenous variables. Findings are unchanged for different instrument lag structures (two lags, three lags, and their 
combinations). Table 4: Loan Dollarization: Benchmark and Extended Model 










































































































































































Trade openness             0.113 
(0.000) 
Forward market liberalization            0.012 
(0.044) 
Asymmetry             -0.041 
(0.003) 
Intervention            -0.006 
(0.172) 
Max inflation rate            0.004 
(0.868) 
Max depreciation rate            -0.390 
(0.002) 
Russian crisis            -0.051 
(0.009) 
Corruption            -0.015 
(0.000) 
Countries / Obs  23 / 3032  23 / 3016  23 / 3016  23 / 2997  23 / 2979  23 / 2979  23 / 2312 
R-square (adjusted)   0.658  0.703    0.670  0.674  0.482 
Wald test of start EU = decision EU  0.564 0.262 0.180  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Wald test of decision EU = join EU  0.003 0.157 0.118  0.009  0.120  0.071  0.009 
Notes: Dependent variable is loan dollarization. p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors for the 2SLS-FE and 2SLS-RE estimators and adjusted for panel 
heteroskedasticity for the FGLS estimator that controls for country fixed effects. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments are the once 
lagged values of the endogenous variables. Results are unchanged when using as instruments the second and third lagged values, and any of their combinations. Findings are also 
qualitatively similar for the variables of interest with Fixed-Effects, Random-Effects, GMM, and FGLS estimators with an error structure of AR(1). The Wald tests present the p-
values of the simple linear hypotheses about the equality of the EU-related parameters in pairs.  APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: EU Accession Process Dates 
 
Beginning of negotiations  End of negotiations Full  membership  Country 
March of 1998  December of 2002  May of 2004  Czech Rep., Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Rep., and 
Slovenia 
December of 1999  April of 2005  January of 2007  Bulgaria and Romania 
October of 2005      Croatia and Turkey 
Notes: Macedonia FYR does not appear in the table. Even though a candidate for EU accession since 2005, as it 



























 Table A2: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Definition  [source] 
Dependent variables   
Deposit dollarization  Foreign currency denominated deposits to total deposits of residents held in resident 
banks [IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) and National Central Banks (NCB)] 
Loan dollarization  Foreign currency denominated credit to total credits of residents issued by resident 
banks [IFS and NCB] 
Independent variables   
Net foreign assets  The ratio of commercial banks’ and other depository corporations’ foreign assets minus 
external liabilities to total domestic deposits [IFS and NCB] 
Restrictions on FC deposits 
(loans) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there are restrictions on residents 
holdings of onshore foreign currency deposits (loans) and 0 otherwise [AREAR, IMF] 
MVP dollar share  [Var(Inflation) + Cov(Inflation, Δ (Real exchange rate) )] / [Var(Inflation) +  Var(Δ 
(Real exchange rate)) + 2Cov(Inflation, Δ (Real exchange rate) )] as constructed by Ize 
and Levy-Yeyati (2003). Following Basso et al. (2007), we compute MVP based on all 
historical information up to the observation point. [Author’s calculation] 
Inflation  Logarithmic difference of the Consumer Price Index [IFS] 
Depreciation  Logarithmic difference of the nominal official exchange rate (national currency/USD) 
[IFS] 
Interest rate difference  Deposit and loan interest rate differences (local currency – foreign currency)/100 [IFS 
and NCB]. No data availability of loan interest rates for Turkey. 
International financial  
integration 
Volume-based measure of international financial integration as constructed by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007): (total external assets + total external liabilities) / GDP [updated 
and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)] 
Start of EU accession 
process  
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the dates of the beginning of the EU 
accession negotiations and before the end of the negotiation process and 0 otherwise 
[http://europa.eu/abc/history]. See Table A3 below for details. 
Decision to join EU  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the dates decided by the EU for  
negotiating countries to join the EU and before full EU membership and 0 otherwise 
[http://europa.eu/abc/history]. See Table A3 below for details. 
EU membership  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after full membership to the EU and 0 
otherwise [http://europa.eu/abc/history]. See Table A3 below for details. 
Trade openness  The ratio of trade to GDP [WDI] 
Forward market 
liberalization 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there exists a functional forward market and 
0 otherwise [Luca and Petrova (2007) and AREAR, IMF] 
Asymmetry  Index of asymmetry of exchange rate movements as constructed by Rennhack and 
Nozaki (2006): assigning a value of 0 in months of currency appreciation and 1 in 
months of currency depreciation [Author’s calculation] 
Intervention  Indicator of exchange rate intervention as constructed by Barajas and Morales (2003): 
(Δint_res/M2)
2 / ((First Difference(Exchange Rate)/ Exchange Rate)
2 + (Δint_res/M2)
2) 
[Author’s calculation drawn from IFS] 
Max inflation rate  Maximum value of inflation rate [IFS] 
Max depreciation rate  Maximum value of change in the exchange rate [IFS] 
Russian crisis  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during August-December 1998 and 0 
otherwise. 
Corruption  Inverse of corruption perception index [Transparency International] Table A3: Country Coverage and Dollarization Data Availability 
 
Country   Deposits  Observations   Loans  Observations 
        
Albania   1992:12-2010:1  206    1998:9-2010:1  137 
Armenia   1995:1-2009:10  178    1998:1-2009:10  142 
Belarus   2000:1-2009:10  118    2003:1-2009:10  82 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    2005:1-2009:12  60    2005:1-2009:12    60 
Bulgaria   1995:12-2009:11 167    1995:12-2009:11  167 
Croatia   1994:6-2009:10  185    1994:6-2009:11      186 
Czech Rep.    1993:1-2009:11  203    1993:1-2009:11  203 
Estonia   1993:1-2009:11  203    1993:1-2009:11  203 
Georgia   1995:1-2009:11  179    1995:10-2009:11  170 
Hungary   1992:1-2009:11  215    1992:1-2009:11  215 
Kazakhstan   1997:12-2010:1  146    1996:1-2010:1  169 
Kyrgyz Rep.    1996:1-2009:11  167    1996:1-2009:11  167 
Latvia   1993:1-2009:11  203    1994:1-2009:11  191 
Lithuania   1993:12-2009:12 193    1993:12-2009:12      193 
Macedonia FYR    2003:1-2009:12  84    2003:1-2009:12    84 
Moldova    2001:12-2010:1  98    2001:12-2010:1    98 
Poland   1993:1-2009:11  203    1996:12-2009:11  156 
Romania   1993:9-2009:11  195    1993:12-2009:11  192 
Russia   1995:6-2008:3  154    1996:12-2009:9  154 
Serbia   2001:12-2009:12 97    2003:12-2009:12  73 
Slovak Rep.    1993:1-2008:12  192    1993:1-2008:12    192 
Slovenia   1991:12-2006:12 181    1991:12-2006:12      181 
Turkey   1986:1-2009:10  286    1996:6-2009:11  163 
Ukraine   1993:1-2009:11  203    1995:1-2009:11  179 
Notes: The data coverage of the EU affiliated countries (members and candidates) appears in Italics. The end of 
the coverage period is shorter for the Slovak Republic and Slovenia as both have adopted the euro as their legal 
tender in January of 2009 and January of 2007 respectively. 
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